OEC-AODV: Optimized Energy Constrained AODV Protocol for Detection and Prevention of JellyFish Delay Variance Attack

Abstract

ABSTRACT

Mobile ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are more vulnerable to different types of attacks due to its insecure communication and dynamic forming technology. JellyFish is a new type of DOS attack which is focus on closed loop protocols like TCP. A main goal of this attack is to decrease the throughput and increase the end to end delay. It leads to decrease the overall performance of network. In order to combat the JellyFish attack in MANETs, this paper proposes a novel technique called Optimized Energy Constrained AODV protocol for Detection and Prevention of JellyFish Delay Variance Attack (OEC-AODV). The Optimized AODV in MANET routing protocol should provide energy efficient multi hop route between source and destination pair. AODV routing protocol selects shortest path for route establishment. But the repeated selection of certain nodes which exhaust battery power of such nodes faster than others. Thus, the routing protocol should consider the residual energy of the nodes for route establishment. In the Optimized AODV protocol source node will determine threshold value of energy i.e. the amount of energy required to complete the communication without any link breakage in network. The OEC- AODV technique aims to maximize the utilization of battery power of nodes based on residual energy. The technique is tested using NS-2 simulator against other existing techniques, i.e. ABC, MABC and APD-JFAD algorithms by various parameters such as throughput, PDR, dropped packet ratio and delay. The results prove that OEC-AODV is highly efficient in JellyFish attack detection and also performs well as compared to other algorithms.

Keywords: Mobile,ad hoc Network,OEC-AODC,types of network layers, JellyFish attack, energy consumption, AODV, packet forwarding, End to end delay.

Cite this Article: I. Kavitha, S. Amutha. OEC-AODV: Optimized Energy Constrained AODV Protocol for Detection and Prevention of JellyFish Delay Variance Attack. International Journal of Satellite Communication & Remote Sensing. 2019; 5 (2): 35-48p.