Balanced Reputation Detective System (BReDS): Proposed Algorithm

Pallavi Bansal, Narender Singh

Abstract


Abstract: In the past, many reputation systems tried to distinguish malicious peers from other honest peers. The reputation of a peer is calculated by summarizing complains of his neighbors who have interacted within. In P2P every peer must keep transaction records. If a peer wants to download a file from providers, he cloud review the transaction records and selects a best provider. After examined Peer-to-Peer network and problems in Peer-to-Peer network it is concluded that there must be a system that minimize these problems. A reputation system is a good choice for handling these types of problem. Because of the open nature of P2P models, the Selfish phenomenon is popular and degrades the system performance. Anonymity may exacerbate this problem since the Selfish cannot be located, and since selfish behaviors might be prevalent without any punishment. So objective of this paper is to design a reputation system for Peer-to-Peer network that can handle Selfish problem in this network efficiently with minimum network load.

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.37628/ijece.v1i1.17

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